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Common Law and the Toxic Tort:
Where Does Superfund Leave the
Private Victim of Toxic Torts?
To say that Congress has spoken is only to begin the inquiry; the
critical question is what Congress has said?'

I.

Introduction

The surgeon general recently declared that toxic chemicals are
creating a major and growing public health problem.' Discoveries
of previously undisclosed dangerous waste sites and other recalcitrant chemical tragedies have produced a pandemic effect on society.3 Hazardous substances, toxic wastes, and industrial by-products
are instilling national fear of uncertainty.
The existing statutory and common law has dealt ineffectively
with hazardous waste accidents. 4 The aggregate effect of the statutes
does not provide a comprehensive strategy to deal with the ominous
qualities of hazardous substances.5 Furthermore, neither the judici1. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 339 n.8 (1981).
2. 125 CONG. REC. 14984 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks by Senator Culver, introducing a letter from Nathan Stark, Undersecretary of Health and Human Services). "The
surgeon general believes that, while at this time it is impossible to determine the precise
dimensions of the toxic chemical problem, it is clear that it is a major and growing public
health problem." Id See also II ENV'T REP. (BNA) 909 (1980).
3. See, e.g., EPA, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1979), which contained the following summaries:
In Lowell, Massachusetts, one million gallons of mixed toxic wastes stored in 15,000
rotting drums and tanks were discovered at a closed waste dump only one quarter of
a mile from inhabited homes .... In Hardeman County, Tennessee, now called the
Valley of the Drums, forty families drink from wells polluted with such pesticides as
endrin, dieldrin, aldrin and heptachlor. The Chemical Company had used a neighboring 300-acre site from 1964 to 1972 for the burial of 300,000 55-gallon drums of
pesticide production residues.
Id at 179. il ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 139 (1980).
4. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976
and Supp. III 1979) (implementing cradle-to-grave legislation for the disposal of hazardous
waste); The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (1976 and Supp. Ill
1979) (regulating interstate water pollution); The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2610-29 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (attempting to regulate toxic substances by requiring premarket testing of toxic substances). Congress intended the Substances Control Act to fill the
gap between pesticide control and the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration. The
Federal Hazardous Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-274 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980),
purports to regulate hazardous substances vis-a-vis the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Seegenerall, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (analysis of the inadequacy of the
existing environmental legislation to protect against improper disposal of hazardous sub-

ary nor the legislature has acted affirmatively to compensate the victims of improper handling of toxic chemicals.6 Thus, the victim
lacks any means of compensatory redress against the industrial
defendant.7
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and
Compensation Act of 1980,8 commonly referred to as Superfund, focuses on the victim's lack of redress. The legislation purportedly
constitutes the most comprehensive environmental legislation.
Superfund, however, contains no explicit provision for compensating
victims of toxic torts.9 In the year following the passage of
Superfund, the Supreme Court determined that federal common-law
concepts' and the theory of implied rights of action I do not apply
to environmental legislation similar in scope to Superfund. These
recent developments suggest that both Congress and the courts are
perpetuating the void between legislative schemes or common-law
remedies, and uncompensated toxic tort victims. This comment analyzes those recent developments and suggests that both Congress and
the courts must act to effectuate compensatory mechanisms for victims of toxic wastes.
II.

The Void

Typically, environmental catastrophes have been addressed in
four ways: traditional common-law theories, out-of-court settlements, statutory law, and federal common law. Traditional common-law theories, out-of-court settlements, and statutory law do not
uniformly address the scope of environmental harm cases. 2 The
disposal of hazardous substances poses a national problem that requires federal action to ensure uniform responses.
A.

Common-Law Remedies

Traditional common-law tort theories do not adequately address the widespread problem of hazardous substances.' 3 Establishstances). The environmental legislation listed above covers only a narrow class of substances
and focuses on a single purpose, thus creating a void in the overall legislative scheme.
6. See infra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 12-40, 159 and accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as Superfund].
9. See infra notes 41-74 and accompanying text.
10. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (construing the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act).
11. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (construing the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401,403-04, 406-09,
411-15, 502, 549, 686-87 (1976)).
12. See generally Pfennigstory, Environmental Damages and Compensation, 1979 A.B.A.
RES. J. 349 (1979) (determining when an activity becomes abnormally dangerous differs
among jurisdictions).
13. See SENATE COMM. ON ENV. AND PUBLIC WORKS, Six CASE STUDIES OF COMPEN-

ing a prima facie case of tortious conduct frequently creates a
barrier, particularly when a litigant seeks recovery for actual bodily
harm caused by exposure to toxic chemicals.' 4 The latent nature of
most toxic substances often makes proof of causation an insurmountable hurdle for private litigants."t The victim confronts substantial difficulty in providing the requisite legal proof and lacks the
resources to acquire the necessary information.
Environmental litigants have successfully used nuisance and
strict liability, two common-law theories, to recover. 6 Nuisance 1is7
often considered the forerunner to environmental harm theories.
Injured victims may pursue a cause of action in nuisance against
both governmental entities' 8 and private individuals.' 9 Strict liability, as reflected in the Restatements of Torts, has developed two approaches to impose liability. The Restatement of Torts, First,
SATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI,
NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS, S. Doc. No. 13, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Six
CASE STUDIES]. The study canvassed recent environmental catastrophes and concluded that

common-law remedies cannot begin to address environmental harm causes.
14. See, e.g., Easton Fruit Co. v. California Spray Chemicals, 103 Ariz. 461, 445 P.2d 437
(1968). A farmer recovered for crop damage against the manufacturer of pesticides containing
2-4-D and Silvex. The 2-4-D, however, a human carcinogen, posed a risk of cancer to the
farmer for which he did not recover. See EPA, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1979).

15.

See generally Milhollin, Long-Term LiabilityforEnvironmentalHarm, 41 U. PITT. L.

REV. 1 (1979).

16. Litigants have also used trespass and negligence theories in environmental harm
cases. A trespass action requires the plaintiff to show ownership or possession of the land and
an invasion by the defendant onto the land. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342
P.2d 790, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1959).

See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

TORTS § 13, at 63 (4th ed. 1971). The concept of trespass has been used recently in the context
of air pollution cases. Eg., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979); Roberts
v. Permanente Corp., 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961). The required duty
analysis under a negligence theory creates problems in environmental tort litigation. See W.
PROSSER, supra § 30 at 143; V. YANNACONE, JR., B. COHEN, I ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES § 3.4 at 83 (1972). Litigants have successfully utilized a negligence cause of action
to recover for reckless interference with land. Copart Industries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 362 N.E.2d 968 (1977).
17. The nuisance cause of action developed in the early 1800's and addresses interferences with another person's or class of persons' right to enjoy the use of the land. A condition
may constitute either a public or private nuisance. For cases categorically defining nuisances
as private, public, or mixed, see, e.g., Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 79 So. 476 (1918); Burnham
v. Hotchkiss, 14 Conn. 311 (1840); Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921); Acme
Fertilizer Co. v. State, 34 Ind. App. 346, 72 N.E. 1037 (1905); Riggins v. District Court, 89
Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935). For application of the nuisance theory in air pollution cases, see,
e.g., Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 321 N.E.2d 412 (1974) (although plaintiffs did not prevail, the court articulated the requirements for a nuisance action).
18. The Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976), does not preclude a nuisance action. Board of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976), appeal
dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977). But see Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist., 1
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1191, af'd, 557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012
(1978).
19. See, e.g., Clinic and Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.w.2d 384
(1951); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970); Evans v. Reading Chemical Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 A. 902 (1894). Both the
Clinical Hospital and the Evans cases recognize private damages for public nuisances. See
generally Prosser, PrivateActionfor Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).

classifies certain activities as ultra-hazardous.2" The Restatement of
Torts, Second, however, delineates criteria for determining when an
abnormally dangerous condition exists.2 ' The trend follows the second version of the Restatement. 22 A cause of action based on nuisance or an abnormally dangerous theory of strict liability, however,
involves a cost-benefit analysis of the condition, which analysis may
pose an insurmountable hurdle to plaintiffs.2 3 While recovery in a
26
25
24
nuisance action may consist of an injunction, damages, or both
20. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938) provides the following:
[Olne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the
activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
21. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) provides the following criteria
for determining when an abnormally dangerous condition exists:
(a) Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f)
extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976).
22. Courts originally adopted the ultrahazardous theory to impose strict liability on unnatural activities. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936). The Turner case borrowed from principles explained in Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 37 L. Ex.
161 (1868), which imposed strict liability on mill owners whose reservoirs overflowed onto
adjoining property. In Turner, the court strictly construed Rylands v. Fletcher to apply only to
a condition unnatural for an area. The court, therefore, refused to find that storing in Texas
salt wastes produced during oil drilling constituted an unnatural activity. The Restatement
Second has adopted the unnatural activity analysis. See, e.g., Fritz v. E.I. duPont deNemours
Co., 75 A.2d 256 (Del. Super Ct. 1950); Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). Courts have relied on both the first and second Restatement of Torts in
finding strict liability. Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976).
23. Both the abnormally dangerous concept of strict liability and the theory of nuisance
have developed as regional concepts. See Cities Service Co. v. Florida, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill.' App. 3d 624, 321
N.E.2d 412 (1974). The classic example is Love Canal, where Hooker Chemical actively generated waste. The actions of Hooker may not have been declared a nuisance or abnormally
dangerous because a substantial economic benefit inured to the community. LOVE CANAL
PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB: SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK AND LEGISLATURE (1970). At that time, experts did not realize the long-range effects of dioxin. See
Milhollin, supra note 15. See also Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride. A Short
Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 BERKLEY ECOLOGY L.Q. 500
(1978) (citing Schelling, TheLife You Save MayBe Your Own, PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS § 127 (S. Chase ed. 1968)). Doniger reviews the procedures that agencies may
undertake to implement a cost-benefit analysis and concludes that: "First, all decisions must
be made under substantial uncertainty about the medical and ecological risks, technological
difficulties and economic costs associated with different degree of exposure. Second, all decisions involve trade-offs among groups with interests that are not readily comparable."
Doniger, supra at 519.
24. Eg., City of Chicago v. Stem, 96 II1. App. 3d 264, 421 N.E.2d 260 (1981); City of
Cloquet v. Cloquet Sand & Gravel, Inc., 251 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1977); Leatherbury v.
Graylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 267, 347 A.2d 826 (1975) (required finding of nuisance per se in
order to abate activity); Nothaus v. City of Salem, 585 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. App. 1979) (denied
injunctive relief but articulated what would satisfy a claim for an injunction); Commonwealth
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974), on remand, 23 Pa. Commw. 496, 353

strict liability actions
generally address personal injury damages, not
loss. 27

economic

Recovery under common-law theories for personal injury from
toxic substances, however, represents the exception to the general
rule. In most cases, the parties settle in the pretrial phase. 28 Although judicial economy favors pretrial settlement, settlement resulting from toxic tragedies exemplifies the disparity between the
industrial defendant and the private litigant.29 Ostensibly, both parties favor settlement because the injured victim receives instant compensation and both parties save litigation expenses. Despite
egregious statutory violations by the chemical industries, victims reA.2d 471 (1974), afyd, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1974), appealdismissed 434 U.S. 807 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Wyeth Laboratories, 12 Pa. Commw. 227, 315 A.2d 648 (1974).
25. E.g., Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1980);
Botsch v. Leigh Land Co., 205 Neb. 401, 288 N.w.2d 31 (1980); Hauser v. Calawa, 116 N.H.
676, 366 A.2d 489 (1976); Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 613 P.2d 63 (1980); Pate v. City
of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1981).
26. Krulikowski v. Polycast Corp., 153 Conn. 661, 220 A.2d 444 (1966); Earl v. Clark,
219 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1974); Mandell v. Pasquaretto, 76 Misc. 2d 405, 350 N.Y.S.2d 561
(1976); Maenchen v. Sand Products Co., 626 P.2d 332 (OkI. Ct. App. 1981); Conkin v. Ruth,
581 P.2d 923 (Okl. Ct. App. 1976); Evans v. Moffat, 192 Pa. Super. 204, 160 A.2d 465 (1960).
27. For example, a cause of action in strict liability, premised on products liability principles, forces a more onerous burden on a potential plaintiff who can only document economic
loss and not personal injury. E.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 543 P.2d 279 (Alaska
1976); Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973);
Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); Nobility Homes,
Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). Nonetheless, courts addressing environmental fiascos have applied strict liability even when the parties have not claimed personal injury damages, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), and at least one
state has extended strict liability to include economic loss by applying the doctrine of strict
liability under the Uniform Commercial Code. Herbstan v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1,
342 A.2d 181 (1978); A-Leet Leasing Corp. v. Kingshead Corp., 150 N.J. Super. 384, 375 A.2d
1208 (1977). Presently, however, the weight of authority precludes a plaintiff from solely recovering economic loss.
28. See Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 515. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corporation, 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (lengthy trial resulting in an award of $505,000
dollars for actual damages and $10 million dollars for punitive damages). The Silkwood case,
an aberration, involved a settlement exceeding many of the settlements canvassed in the Six
CASE STUDIES.

29. The Kepone incident in Virginia illustiates the disparity. An allied chemical plant
discharged Kepone into the James River and permitted the chemical to permeate the plant. As
a result, a substantial number of employees suffered Kepone poisoning. The estimated aggregate amount of loss to the employees exceeded two billion dollars, including 119 million dollars of documented medical payments. The claims totalled 108.9 million dollars. Settlement
negotiations commenced shortly after the claimants filed. The court fined the responsible
party, Allied Chemical, 13.2 million dollars. Thereafter, Allied Chemical established a fund
for Kepone-related problems. In the end, Allied expended over 13 million dollars in satisfaction of claims, while receiving tax reductions of four million dollars. Further, Allied experienced no adverse business ratings as a result of the Kepone incident. See Soble, A Proposal
for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution, 14 HARV. L. LEG.
683 (1977) (Soble received the compilation of the damages from Timothy G. Hayes, Assistant
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia). See generally,Hearings on the Kepone Contamination in Hopewell, Virginia Before the Subcommittee on AgriculturalResearch and General
Legislation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
See also Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 13 (discussion of the incident); Hazardous and Toxic
Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on EnvironmentalPollution and Resource Protection of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
Part I-I (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous and Toxic Waste Report1.

main unaware and unapprised of the harm associated with the exposure to toxic substances. Thus, unequal bargaining power and
inadequate information have dominated settlements and resulted in
inequitable compensation.3 °
B.

Current Statutory Regulation

Ranging from pesticide control to solid waste management, environmental statutes, more than traditional common-law theories,
represent the product of environmental fiascos. 3 ' Consequently, the
32
statutes more closely apply to current environmental problems.
Legislatures have geared environmental statutes primarily to enforcement against the chemical industries 33 and have thus provided
regulatory mechanisms at both state and federal levels. 34 These regulatory statutes provide extensive administrative remedies to the
government, but no compensatory remedies to the injured party."
Regulatory statutes do provide some relief for private individuals. For example, many environmental statutes authorize civil
30. See, e.g., SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at XIV. The study revealed the following
statistics:
State
Compensation Sought ($)
Compensation Obtained ($)
Alabama
1.6 billion
private plaintiffs settled
for undisclosed amount;
Alabama settled its 100
million suit for 67,500
Michigan

fines and 15 million
clean-up operation;
60 million

settled for $15 million
cleanup and I million fine;
claimed 59,350,000
won 120,000

Missouri

2.5 million

227,000 and I suit pending

New Jersey

confidential

Texas

19 million

settled for 200,000

580,000 in settlements; 2
suits pending.
31. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-61 (1976 & Supp. Ill
1979), provided the basis for environmental legislation. Thereafter, the legislature promulgated and amended statutes to reflect current environmental problems. E.g., Federal Waste
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 1-376 (1976 & Supp. Ii 1979); Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-36y (1976 & Supp. II1 1979 and Supp. IV 1980): Oil
Pollution Act, ch. 316, § 1, 43 Stat. 604 (1924) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)); Oil Pollution Act, § 1961, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1976), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976 and Supp. II1 1979); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
32. See supra notes 5 and 31.
33. The statutes address specific and narrow problems relevant solely to the industry.
For example, the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979),
applies only to substances presenting a certain risk prior to manufacture; the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), addresses
hazardous wastes at the generator and disposal level.
34.

See supra note 31. See generally Wooley, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ISSUES: THE

RELATION OF FEDERAL LAWS TO STATE PROGRAMS (1981).

35. The dichotomy in statutes broadens the void between the toxic tort remedy and the
injured victim. Statutes generally either regulate or compensate. Consequently, two statutes
may contain two different triggering mechanisms. See generally supra note 31.

suits.3 6 Thus, private individuals may pursue an injunction to enforce the provisions of the particular statute. In addition, a private
individual, as an aggrieved party, may seek judicial review of action
taken by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.37 Significantly, the civil suit mechanism operates on the
presumption that private citizens know when the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency has acted or failed to act in
enforcing a statute.3 8 Finally, environmental statutes generally preserve existing causes of action.39
Theoretically, the private individual enjoys both statutory and
common-law protection. In reality, however, the civil suit provisions
and the common-law causes of action have failed to compensate the
victim of toxic time bombs." A major environmental catastrophe
causes the government to sue for massive civil penalties, resulting
from the statutory violation, and causes the commencement of settlement negotiations. Aside from these settlement negotiations, which
inevitably end unfairly, the victim must contend with whatever latent harm manifests itself without compensatory redress.
III. Bridging the Gap
A.

Superfund

Legislative bills designed to aid victims of toxic torts inundated
the 95th and 96th sessions of Congress,4 ' resulting in the enactment
36. E.g., Deep Water Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979); Marine, Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 14 15(g)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1976) & Supp. II1 1979); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
37. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
38. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1979). In all
of these cases, the plaintiffs pursued an implied right of action because the time limitation set
by the express statutory provisions had lapsed. The inability of the litigants to satisfy the time
limitations indicates the impracticality of the civil suit provisions in protecting victim rights.
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir.
1980). See also Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygenic Env't Etc. v. Eaton, 644 F.2d
995 (3d Cir. 1981). One court, however, has required compliance with the statutory time limitation under an implied right of action. Brede v. Scharbath, 483 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Wis.
1980).
39. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 33 U.S.C. § 1515(e) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979); 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1976 & Supp. III
1979); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(0 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
40. See supra notes 28-30, 36-38 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., H.R. 1049, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1213 (daily ed. January
18, 1979); H.R. 5291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7951 (daily ed. September 14,
1979); H.R. 5074, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 72001 (daily ed. August 2, 1979); H.R.
5617, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 9331 (daily ed. October 17, 1979); H.R. 4571, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 4957 (daily ed. June 21, 1979); H.R. 4566, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 4957 (daily ed. June 21, 1979); H.R. 4075, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. 3121 (daily ed. May 14, 1979); H.R. 5790, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
10246 (daily ed. November 2, 1979); H.R. 5749, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1005758 (daily ed. October 31, 1979); H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 3283 (daily ed.

of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act of 1980.42 This most recent attempt to regulate industrial wastes attempted the novel approach of combining regulation
with compensation.4 3 The Act, commonly labelled Superfund, articulates new standards of liability in addressing the release of hazardous substances into the environment.' Currently, however, the Act
does not explicitly provide personal injury compensation.
Superfund seeks to identify and remedy the problems resulting
from the release of hazardous substances into the environment by
imposing stringent reporting requirements. Also, Superfund imposes liability for noncompliance with the reporting requirements
and the permissible release requirements.45 The Act establishes a 1.6
billion dollar compensation fund4 6 financed by taxes levied on oil
importers and refineries, and on the manufacturers and producers of
inorganic chemicals.4 7 These taxes will continue in effect until
1985.48
Superfund establishes a lexicon of statutory definitions in delineating those subject to the duties imposed by the Act.4 9 Many of
Superfund's definitions incorporate various provisions of existing
legislation. For example, the definition of "environment" applies
Superfund to both navigable waters and drinking water supplies.5"
A federally permissible release of a hazardous substance must comply with the specifications set forth in both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act. 5 The definition
of a "hazardous substance" encompasses hazardous substances included in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Solid Waste
substance regulated
Disposal Act, and any inherently hazardous
52
Act.
Control
Substance
Toxic
the
under
May 15, 1979); S 1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7694 (daily ed. June 14, 1979); S.
1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 9173 (daily ed. June 11, 1979).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (Supp. IV 1980).
43. The compensation provision was deleted from the liability section.
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (Supp. IV 1980).
45. Id §§ 9602, 9607.
46. Id. § 963 1(b)(2).
47. Id § 963 1(b)(1)(A).
48. Id. § 9653.
49. Id. § 9601.
50. Id, § 9601(8). This section defines "environment" as follows:
(8) Environment means (A) The navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous
zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are under the exclusive management authority of the United States under the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976 [16 U.S.C.S. § 1801 et seq] and (B) any other
surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface
strata, or ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the
United States.
51. The following definition of "release" reinforces the broad underlying purposes of the
Act: "Release means any spilling, leaking, pumping pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment...." Id

§ 9601(22).
52.

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9602 (Supp. IV 1980).

The compensation provisions of Superfund address response
costs for both active5 3 and inactive54 disposal facilities. Victims may
secure compensation through the response fund for those releases or
discharges emanating from the active facility5" or through the PostClosure Trust Fund, a fund created specifically for inactive waste
disposal sites. 6
Criminal and civil penalties complement three of the Act's crucial liability aspects. First, failure to notify the Environmental Protection Agency of a facility generating or disposing hazardous wastes
may result in fine, imprisonment, or both." Second, failure to provide sufficient remedial action in the event of a release, or a threat of
release, may result in punitive treble damages based on the total cost
of clean-up. Third, evidence of the manufacturer's willful negligence or willful misconduct may require the manufacturer to pay the
total cost of clean-up, despite liability limitations. 9
The legislative history of Superfund consistently communicates
60
that the legislation must address compensation for injured victims.

Superfund arrived after three years of legislative action spurred by
toxic time bombs. Polychlorinated by-phenyls, 6 t kepone,6 2 dioxin,6 3
53. Id § 9607.
54. Id § 9631.
55. Id §§ 9607, 9611.
56. Id § 9641.
57. Id § 9603.
58. Id § 9607(c)(3).
59. Id § 9607(c)(2).
60. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 11791 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (statement of Mr.
Broyhill); 126 CONG. REC. 11794 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (statement of Mr. Vento); 126
CONG. REC. 14963 (daily ed. November 24, 1980) (statement of Senator Randolph). See generally S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See infra notes 69-70.
61. The Environmental Protection Agency has recently banned polychlorinated bi-phenyls, commonly referred to as PCBs. PCBs, carcinogenic in nature, escape from the insulation
fluid of transformers. For example, when the General Electric Company discharged the fluid
into the Hudson River, PCBs pervaded prepared foods and spread through 19 states. See S.
REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 7 (1960); EPA, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 180 (1978). See also 126 CONG. REC. 14963 (daily ed.

November 24, 1980) (statement of Senator Randolph).
62. Kepone absorbs into the human body through the bloodstream and may cause neurological damage, metabolic disturbances, liver damage, and testicular damage resulting in
sterility. See Hearingson the Kepone Contamination in Hopewell Virginia Before the Subcommittee on AgriculturalResearch and GeneralLegislation ofhe Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry,supra note 29.
63. Dioxin, the lethal carcinogen that captured the primary attention at Love Canal, has
proved one hundred times more deadly than strychnine. See EPA, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 177 (1979). The health problems include
spontaneous abortions, birth defects, epilepsy, rectal bleeding, and possible latent illness. See
Hazardousand Toxic Waste Disposal- Hearings before the Subcomm. on Env 7 Pollution and
Resource Protectionof the Senate Comm. on Env. and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part
1 (1980) (testimony of Dr. Beverly Diagen) [hereinafter cited as the Hazardous and Toxic

Waste DisposalReport]; LOVE CANAL-PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB: A SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1978). According to one report, the damage caused by

dioxin remains unknown:
Still worse, as the company recently acknowledged, Hooker buried up to 3700 tons of
trichlorophenol waste, which contains one of the world's most deadly chemicals, di-

benzene,' and other carcinogens catalyzed the growing alarm over
hazardous substances. Investigators discovered toxic contaminants
in well waters and traced the contaminants to closed-waste sites containing rotting drums that were leaking poisonous wastes. 65 The resulting ailments included cancer of the liver, leukemia, spontaneous
abortions, and birth defects in chicken.66 These findings motivated
the legislation.67
Congress considered third-party personal injury claims in contemplating the Act. 68 The House offered an array of proposals,
which, though not an integral part of Superfund, would have created
69
a separate agency to adjudicate third-party personal injury claims.
The Senate strongly advocated third-party personal injury claims as
part of the strict liability regime of Superfund.7 ° In addition, the
Senate set forth a private cause of action that comported with the
remedial provisions of the Act.7 '
As the 97th Congress approached adjournment, the Senate comoxin, at various sites in Niagara County between 1947 and 1972. Investigators immediately sought to determine whether dioxin had seeped out and indeed the substance
was identified in small quantities within leachate taken from the periphery of the
Love Canal, an indication that it may have begun to migrate. There are now believed to be an estimated 141 pounds of dioxin in the Canal site and as much as 2,000
pounds buried elsewhere in the County.
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
64. Studies have associated benzene with leukemia and chronic blood disorders: "A recent study found that typical exposure of a householder using benzene to strip furniture would
exceed not only the current standard for occupational exposure but also the standard established before benzene's leukemogenic properties are taken into account." EPA, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 179 (1979).
65. See Hazardousand Toxic Waste DisposalReport,supra note 63, Part I, at 39 (300,000
barrels and about 10 million chemicals found on an isolated 24 acres).
66. See generally EPA, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1979); EPA, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1978); Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Committee Reports, supra note 63; S.
REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1980); LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB: A
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK (1978).
67. See Hazardous and Toxic Waste Report, supra note 63, at Parts 1-11.
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., H.R. 1049, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), combined with H.R. 1048, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and reoffered as H.R. 5291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7951
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1979); H.R. 5790, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 10246 (daily ed.
November 2, 1979); H.R. 5749, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 125 CONG. REC. 10057-58 (daily
ed. October 31, 1979). See also H.R. 5074, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 72001 (daily
ed. August 2, 1979). Representative Brodhead introduced this bill on August 8, 1979. The bill,
The Toxic Substance Pollution Victim Compensation Act, would have established an independent agency, the Administrative Board for Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substances, to compensate victims of hazardous substances. The bill closely paralleled a Model
Act proposed in Soble, .4 Proposalfor the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic
Substance Pollution.- A ModelAct, 14 HARV. J. LEG. 683 (1977). The proposal resulted from
extensive research that canvassed the problems of third-party recovery and reviewed the aspects of a similar act that Japan has successfully implemented. The House concentrated on the
scope of the bill's coverage. See H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 3283 (daily ed.
May 15, 1979).
70. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 9173 (daily ed. June 11, 1979). See
generally Hazardous and Toxic Waste DisposalReport, supra note 63.
71. Section 4 articulated both the standard of liability and the procedure for handling
claims. S 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 9173 (daily ed. June 11, 1979).

promised the third-party personal injury provision in an attempt to
receive the required approval of the House. 2 Paradoxically, the victims who served as the impetus for this legislation receive no coverage from the legislation.
Despite the failure to include compensatory mechanisms for
victims, Superfund cursorily attempts to bridge the gaps between environmental regulatory legislation and environmental compensatory
legislation; and between the unprotected victim and the manufacturer of hazardous substances. The Act does provide various mechanisms for holding the manufacturer accountable to the injured
victim, but none afford him compensation.7 3 Thus, although
Superfund sounds in victim protection, this victim-based statute fails
4
to recompense the victim.
Nonetheless, the framers of Superfund remained confident that
the judicial response would begin where legislative action ceased."
Federal courts may achieve the purpose of the statute by applying
federal common-law precepts.76
B.

FederalCommon Law and the Implied Right of Action

78
The federal common law 77 and the implied right of action
have pervaded the judicial system for over a century.7 9 Extrapolating the historical antecedents of these concepts provides a basis for
applying them to effectuate Superfund's remedial purposes. The
Supreme Court, however, has recently scrutinized both concepts
strictly, particularly in cases involving environmental statutes.8 °
Nonetheless, the current usage intimated by the Court suggests that
both the federal common-law and the implied right of action concepts will remain a viable avenue for private litigants seeking recov72. See 126 CONG. REC. 14948-62 (daily ed. November 24, 1980) (text of proposed compromise, amended No. 2631); 126 CONG. REC. 11773-87 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (text of
compromise offered by the Senate). See 126 CONG. REC. 14962 (daily ed. November 24, 1980)
(statement of Senator Stafford), which asserts the following: "We are not here to discuss a
compromise of the reported bill in order to find solutions to these urgent problems. We seek
compromise because we are realistis." Id. See also 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 141 (1980); 38
CONG. Q. 1290 (weekly report, November 29, 1980); 38 CONG. Q. 3509 (weekly report, December 6, 1980).
73. See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
75. Eg., 126 CONG. REC. 11787 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (statement of Representative Fiorio). See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 85-169 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 121-68 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 138 (1824) (federal
character of a right), Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (for every right there
is a remedy).
80. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clamrnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981). See infra notes 87-146 and accompanying text.

ery from manufacturers of hazardous substances. 8 '
Initially, the courts considered the federal common law and the
implied right of action immiscible concepts. While the implied right
of action existed as a substantive right emanating from a statute, 2
federal common law derived from federal concerns independent of
any statute.83 Either a federal common law of strict liability or an
implied right of action would bring Superfund to the stage envisioned by its drafters.
1. Federal Common Law. -Federal common law constitutes
the body of law that fills the interstices of a pervasive federal framework in order to avoid subjecting relevant federal interests to the
inconsistencies of state law.8 4 The federal common-law concept of
nuisance, a variant of the traditional common-law concept of nui-

sance,8 5 originally served as a jurisdictional mechanism for one state
to seek redress from another state in the Supreme Court.86
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,87 the seminal case regarding the
federal common law of nuisance, Illinois instituted an action against
four cities in Wisconsin for the disposal of inadequately treated sewage into Lake Michigan.8 8 Because air and water in their ambient or
interstate natures qualify as federal concerns, the Supreme Court
sought to fashion a cause of action to promote a uniform standard of
dealing with a state's environmental rights beyond its borders.8 9
The Supreme Court delivered the original Illinois decision during the early years of affirmative environmental legislation.9" Relying on a long line of precedent, the Court considered the federal
common law of nuisance a necessary supplement to existing legisla81. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
82. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
83. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 91 (1938); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906).
84. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
85. E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
86. Eg., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208 (1901). See also Committee for Consideration of Jones Fall Sewage v. Train, 375
F. Supp. 1148 (D.C. Md. 1974) (court indicated that the presence of governmental units as
plaintiffs weighed heavily in finding that a federal cause of action existed). But see United
States ex rel Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (no requirement of controversy between sovereigns).
87. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
88. Id at 93.
89. The court stated, "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned." 406 U.S. at 103 (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 457 (1957)). See also Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
90. The Court utilized the 1971 version of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

tion. 9 On remand to the district CoUrt, 9 2 however, the case was decided during an environmental legislation upsurge. 93 Accordingly,
the court held that the existing legislation, specifically the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, provided the courts with the necessary
policy guidelines to implement this legislation.94
In the first Illinois decision, the Supreme Court established a
federal common law of nuisance but did not substantively define
that concept. 95 Nonetheless, the decision laid the foundation for the
development of a federal common law of nuisance by identifying the
federal interest. 96 Moreover, the decision established the availability
97
of the federal common law of nuisance to parties other than states.
The concept's lack of substantive clarity, however, caused the courts
to vacillate in determining the parameters of the concept and to
whom it should apply. Courts tended to expand the scope of the
federal common-law nuisance concept and increasingly allowed
state entities and private litigants to utilize it.98
Most recently, the Supreme Court stultified the development of
the federal common law of nuisance in City of Milwaukee v. Ili91. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oenck Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92 (1938); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236 (10th Cir. 1971).
92. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
93. See Water Pollution Control Act, § , 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. III 1979). See
also The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976 & Supp. III 1979 and
Supp. IV 1980); The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
94. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). See also 406 U.S. at 103 n.5, in which the Court stated:
"While the various federal environmental protection statutes will not necessarily mark the
outer bounds of the federal common law they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning
such rules of decision." Id
95. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Court rendered its decision in a procedural context, and
classified the issue of federal common law as a federal question.
96. 406 U.S. at 103-05.
97. 406 U.S. at 98-99, 105-06. "Thus it is not only the character of the parties that require us to apply federal law. . . [w]here there is an overriding federal interest in the need for
a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we
have fashioned federal common law." Id at 105 n.8.
98. See, e.g., Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygenic Env't v. Eaton, 644 F.2d
995 (3d Cir. 1981); Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (Ist Cir. 1981); Glus v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980) (court relied on
federal common law of nuisance principles in labor relations case); National Sea Clammers
Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 449 U.S. 917 (1981); City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Co., 604 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1025 (1979); Indiana Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 515 F.2d
1036 (7th Cir. 1975); East End Yacht Club v. Shell Oil, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1047 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp.
1127 (D. Conn. 1980) (federal common law of nuisance implicit in Resource Conservation
Recovery Act); Chesapeake Bay Village Inc. v. Costle, 502 F. Supp. 213 (D.C. Md. 1980);
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Virginia State Water, 495 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Va. 1980); Parsell v.
Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976).

nois. " The Court held that the 1972 amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act'0° entirely preempted the federal common law of nuisance. The Court felt that the purported comprehensiveness of the legislative scheme obviated the need for federal
common-law principles. The majority feared that lower courts
would impose stricter efficiency limitations than those imposed by
the legislation.'' Accordingly, the majority held that a federal common law applies only until preempted by. comprehensive legislation.
The dissent, citing historical precedent and the legislative history of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, found this result incongruous. The dissent noted that the legislative history explicitly stated
that the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act should not hinder or affect existing common-law
remedies, spe02
cifically the federal common law of nuisance.'
The Supreme Court's Illinois decision effectively presumes comprehensive legislative efforts by Congress. However, it remains
doubtful whether Congress intended the 1972 amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act to foreclose preexisting common-law approaches. 0 3
Courts patterned the federal interest, originally conceived in environmental harm cases as the federal common law of nuisance, after the common-law concept of nuisance. ° At the time the interest
originated, courts utilized the nuisance theory more than any other
in environmental cases. 1 5 Significantly, the federal cause of action
posited by the Senate and the common-law approach advocated by
the House demonstrate the need to replace the federal common law
of nuisance with a federal common law of strict liability.
The circumambient nature of the hazardous substances regulated under Superfund, as well as the further regulation of hazardous
substances in navigable waters and ground water supplies, depicts
the federal interest implicit in Superfund. 0 6 Furthermore, the mi99. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Brennen, Stewart, White, and Powell joined.
100. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
101. The Court concluded: "Federal courts lack authority to impose more stringent efficient limitations under federal common law than those imposed by the agency charged by
Congress with administering this comprehensive scheme." 451 U.S. at 320.
102. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissented in Illinois, relying to a great extent on the legislative history. Id. at 342-44.
103. The legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act evinces the congressional intent to leave the federal common law of nuisance intact. Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 814 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), which addressed the issue of the federal common law of
nuisance, pended during enactment of the amendments. According to Senate understanding,
the amendments would not affect the federal common law. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 318 n.10 (1981).
104. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
105. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
106. Superfund addresses the release of hazardous substances into navigable waters and

gratory propensities of many of the substances regulated under
Superfund often cause difficulty in ascertaining the source of the pollution. °7 Thus, hazardous substances easily satisfy the criteria for
identifying a federal interest. 0 8 Fashioning the federal cause of action will require the use of strict liability because Superfund both
explicitly and implicitly recognizes that standard.' 0 9
The concept of strict liability represents the most liberal approach to environmental harm cases. "0 The release of hazardous
substances into the environment does not qualify as an inevitable byproduct of industrialization or as a societal problem. " ' Manufacturers, however, cannot expect innocent victims to shoulder the costs of
actions not within the victims' control or knowledge. In certain situations, including Superfund, legislation has justified strict liability
concepts on the rationale that the manufacturer must bear the cost of
introducing the chemical into the market. 1 2 Therefore, chemical industries must begin to internalize the full costs of producing chemical substances; Superfund implements this rationale." 3
Superfund articulates a standard of strict liability and delineates
rights and duties, but does not make those rights and duties explicitly
applicable to private individuals."I4 Nonetheless, Congress enviground water supplies. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (Supp. IV 1980). See Hinderlider v. La Plata, 304
U.S. 92 (1938).
107.

See, e.g., EPA, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY (1979), in which the agency reported: "When the United States biological survey
tested a 39 year old 17 acre landfill at Islip, New York, it found the leachate plume extended
one mile from the site and was 1200 feet wide and 170 feet deep. The leachate had fouled
about I billion gallons of water." Id
108. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
I10. See, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (imposition of strict liability for environmental calamities); City of Bridgeton v. R.P. Oil Inc., 146
N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976). See also supra notes 22-23 for cases construing strict
liability in connection with federal environmental statutes.
I 1l. The chemical manufacturers urged governmental funding alleging that the lack of
control over hazardous substances is a societal problem. 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1343, 1602
(1979). The drafters of Superfund did not accept that position. See also 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
2068 (1979); 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 229 (1980).
112. Products liability actions base strict liability on the rationale that the manufacturer
must bear the cost of introducing the product into the market. Significantly, the cost-benefit
analysis implicit in the abnormally dangerous concept limits and modifies the products liability rationale. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). See also Kiemmer, The Enterprise Liability of Torts, 47 U.
COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976), in which the author commented: "The enterprise rationale is premised on the notion that losses historically recognized as compensable when caused by an
enterprise or activity. . . ought to be borne by those persons who have some logical relationship with that enterprise or activity." Id at 158. This rationale most closely parallels the
ultrahazardous concept of strict liability in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).

113. See 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1347 (1979) (Superfund adopts the ultrahazardous rationale). See also Note, Strict Liabilityfor Generators,Transportersand Disposersof Hazardous
Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949 (1980) (discussion of applicability of § 402A to case involving
hazardous substances); W. Pfenningstory, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979
A.B.A. RES. J. 349 (1979).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).

sioned implied remedies for private individuals." 5 Superfund preserves existing causes of action, and the Act's legislative history
demonstrates that achieving the desired flexibility for the Act mandated preserving the common law."i 6 Utilizing federal common-law
concepts provides the opportunity to promote that flexibility.
By incorporating certain provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Superfund bases liability on the concept of liability
without fault. Strict liability under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act gained acceptance in cases decided pursuant to that
Act." 7 While the legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act ostensibly maintained the federal common law of nuisance, t 8 the legislative history of Superfund focuses on strict liability.'' 9 The legislative history of Superfund evidences the
congressional purpose to replace the federal common law of nuisance with the federal common law of strict liability.'2 °
Courts have held that federal common law exists independently
of statutory law. Whether private litigants will have available a federal common law of strict liability depends on whether a private
right of action exists implicitly in Superfund. The corollary of the
statutory right and the federal common law is the implied right of
action tailored to the federal statute.
2 The ImpliedRight of PrivateAction. -Like the federal common law, over one hundred years of legal precedent support the concept of an implied right of private action.' 2 ' Until 1975, courts
followed the common-law presumption that disregard of the law resulting in damages to one of the class for whose special benefit
the
22
statute was enacted mandated the right to recover damages.'
115. Initially, Superfund articulated the standards ofjoint, several, and strict liability. Instead of a statutory definition, however, the drafters of the Act deferred to the judiciary. 126
CONG. REC. HI 1787 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (statement of Representative Florio).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (Supp. IV 1980); see generally 126 CoNG. REC. Hl 1794-96 (daily ed.
December 3, 1980); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
117. Stuart Transportation Co. v. United States, 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing 1970
U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS 2691, 2712; Burgers v. M/V Tamaro, 564 F.2d 964 (Ist Cir.
1977)).
118. See generally 1970 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS 2691-750.
119. 126 CONG. REC. H 11793 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (text of final debate); 126
CONG. REC. S14929 (daily ed. November 24, 1980) (text of final debate and compromise);
H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; 125 CONG. REC. H1213 (daily ed. January 18, 1979); S1460,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978); 125 CONG. REC. S9173 (daily ed. June 11, 1979).
120. Id See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
121. Gorris v. Scott, 9 L.R. 125 (Exch. 1874) (The interest protected by the statute and
violated by the wrong gives rise to the implied right.).
122. Two seminal cases, J.l. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1974), and Texas and Pacific Ry.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), preserved this presumption. In Rigsby, the Supreme Court held
that disregard of a statute resulting in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted provided the injured party with an implied right to recover damages. Similarly, the court in Borak held that an implied right of action will accrue when necessary to
effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the statute.

A private right of action currently exists under array of federal
statutes that do not expressly provide a right of action. 2 3 This right
of action results from a test, adopted by the Supreme Court to meet
the threat of litigious citizens threatening judicial economy, used to
determine when an implied right of action exists:
First is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted. Second is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit either to create a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy or deny one. Fourth, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law in an
area basically the concern of the state so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. r4
Congressional intent has become the touchstone for determining when an implied right of action exists.' 2 5 The first, third, and
fourth factors are the criteria by which courts determine congres26
sional intent for an implied right of action under a statute.
The Supreme Court has received the concept of a private right
of action under environmental statutes unpropritiously. 27 In much
the same fashion that the Supreme Court discounted the federal
common law of nuisance, the Court has also failed to acknowledge
the implied right of action under environmental statutes. In two recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court relied on two different ten128
ets to deny the implied right of action.
In California v. Sierra Club, 129 the private-party respondents
sought an injunction pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.' ° The legislative history of the Rivers and
Harbors Act provided no indication of congressional intent to either
imply or deny a remedy for the private litigant. Silence in the legis123. Recent decisions have discussed implied rights of action particularly in securities
cases. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 428 U.S. 185
(1975); Superintendent of Ins. & Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1946). See also Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (civil rights vase); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (197 1) (private cause of action implied under the fourteenth amendment as a result of an unconstitutional
search of the plaintiffs apartment).
124. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted).
125. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981); California v.
Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Contu, 101 S. Ct. 1451
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
126. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
127. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 453 U.S. 287 (1981).
128. Middlesex County Sewarage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 453 U.S. 287 (1981).
129. 453 U.S. 287 (1981).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).

lative history may demonstrate congressional intent not to create the
right, 3' or it may demonstrate congressional acquiescence in the
continuance of a private right of action that existed prior to the statute's enactment. 32 When Congress originally enacted the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, a private person had available a remedy
for any injury suffered by reason of a violation of the statute.' 3 3
Hence, congressional silence at the time of the statute's enactment
may well have reflected a congressional assumption that private parties would continue to have available the remedy granted by the statute.' 3 4 Nonetheless, the Court failed to find that Congress intended
The
to confer statutory rights on an especial class of people.'
Court therefore denied the private right of action.
Most recently, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,136 the Supreme Court again refused to recognize the implied right of action under an
environmental statute. The National Sea Clammers Association
brought an action for damages pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act' 37 and the Marine Protection and Sanctuaries
Act."'38 The Association sought recovery for the discharge of sewage
that caused a massive growth of algae. The algae subsequently died
and destroyed an enormous amount of marine life. The Third Circuit analyzed the case under both the implied right of action concept
and the federal common law of nuisance. The court found a private
131. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The defense often raised to implied rights of
action is application of the rule expressio unius est exclusion alterius, or, expression of one thing
excludes another. Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929). The Supreme Court has
construed this rule to mean that silence in the legislative history indicates that Congress meant
only to provide those remedies specifically articulated. Eg., National Railioad Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
132. E.g., Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
133. Congress enacted the Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act partially in response to a
case in which private parties sought relief for the construction of a bridge over navigable
water. Williamete Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888). The Act's legislative history
did not state that the statute would continue to afford private litigants the same rights, but
recognized the existing common-law remedy for breach of a statute. Eg., Hayes v. Michigan
Central R. Co., II I U.S. 228 (1884).
134. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (concurring opinion of Justice Stevens). Justice Stevens pointed out that the controlling common-law precept at that time would
have permitted the private right:
The then current edition of Cooley's Treatise on the Law of Torts 788-790 (1888)
described the common-law remedy for breach of a statutory duty in this way:
When the duty imposed by statute is manifestly intended for the protection and,
benefit of individuals, the common law, when an individual is injured by the
breach of the duty, will supply a remedy, if the statute gives none.
Id at 299 n.2.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens felt that Congress probably assumed that private parties
would enjoy a remedy by virtue of the statute. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens felt constrained by
the Cori v. Ash analysis and denied the implied right of action on that basis.
135. Id at 297-98.
136. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-376 (1976).
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1401-44 (1972).

right of action implicit in both.' 3 9
The Supreme Court dismissed the case with only a perfunctory
application of its own test." 40 Relying primarily on the availability
of statutorily authorized enforcement suits for private citizens, the
Court felt that Congress did not intend to authorize additional judicial remedies.4' Although both statutes preserved all existing remedies, the Court construed the word "other" to mean any other statute
except the one in which it was contained.' 4 2
In spite of these Supreme Court decisions, the legislative history
of Superfund compels the creation of an implied right of action for
private individuals. Although the remedy does not explicitly appear
in the statute, the congressional intent that private litigants should
receive the same protection that the statute grants the government
implies the remedy."' 3
The Supreme Court has postulated a semantic distinction to determine whether Congress enacted a statute for the benefit of an especial class of people.'44 A statute that articulates a right and a duty
for a class provides strong evidence of intent to create an implied
private right of action."4 5 A statute creating only a duty will evidence a statute created for the public at large, and not for the especial benefit of a certain class.'" The operative language of
Superfund makes abundantly clear the Act's purpose to create rights
and duties on behalf of a certain class of people.
Superfund addresses victims exposed to hazardous substances
as a class and, in broad terms, makes various provisions acknowledg139. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980). In
conjunction with identifying the federal interest, the Third Circuit conducted the refined Cort
analysis: "In order to give full effect to the federal common law of nuisance recognized in
Illinois [v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)], private parties should be permitted and
indeed encouraged to participate in the abatement of such nuisances." Id at 1234. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(c) (1979) (pecuniary recovery for loss attributed to a
public nuisance).
140. 453 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1981). See also the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, id at 2233.
141. Id at 18.
142. Id at 16 n.26.
143. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See also infra
notes 146-47.
145. Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Allen v. State Board of Electors, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1961); Turnstall v.
Locomotive Firemen & Engineer, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Virginia R. Co. v. System Federation
No. 40, 300 U.S. 575 (1936); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1915). This distinction inextricably intertwines with the rights and remedies analysis implicit in the federal question aspect of the federal common law of nuisance. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid
Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1979); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1971), remanded,599 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated andremanded,
451 U.S. 304 (1981).
146. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1974); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1962); T.I.M.E.,
Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).

ing that class.' 4 7 In the event of a release of hazardous substances in
violation of federally permitted release requirements, the responsible
party may bear the expenses of persons affected by the release. 48
The Act requires the undertaking of research to assess both the
49
short- and long-term effects of exposure to hazardous substances.
Superfund establishes the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, which, in cooperation with state agencies, obtains information about toxic related injuries and reports all information directly
to the surgeon general. 5 0° In an emergency, the agency must conduct
medical testing on exposed individuals as well as research to determine the relationship between exposure to hazardous substances and
toxic illnesses. 15 ' A private individual's sole benefit from this legislation is the research and testing mandated after the individual's exposure to hazardous substances; this situation hardly compensates the
victim of a hazardous waste spill.
Superfund in many respects resembles other environmental statutes.' 52 The Act provides for elaborate enforcement mechanisms,
currently available only to the government. 153 Unlike other statutes,
however, Superfund does not provide any explicit remedies for the
private citizen. Superfund has no civil suit mechanism to enable the
private individual to trigger action by the Environmental Protection
Agency.' 54 This situation results in the anomaly that natural resources belonging to the government receive greater protection than
1 55
human beings.
The drafters of Superfund realized that only a legislative solution of broader dimensions could deal with toxic time bombs. 5 6 The
Act's failure to provide an explicit remedy in addition to the strong
legislative intent supporting a private cause of action should signal
the courts that the Act implies the private action. 57 Both the House
147. The Senate, in formulating the proposed personal injury provisions, explicitly stated
that the remedial provisions applied only to victims who suffered harm as a result of exposure
to hazardous substances. S. REP. No. 848, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980). See generally 126
CONG. REC. 14929-15009 (daily ed. November 24, 1980) (Senate debate); 126 CONG. REC.
H 11773-802 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (House debate); Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Report, supra note 63.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
149. d § 9611(c).
150. Id § 9604(i).
151. Id § 9604.
152. The list of definitions incorporating provisions of other legislation clearly illustrates
the similarity. Id § 9601. See also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
153. See id §§ 9602-04, 9607, 9612, 9614.
154. Generally, statutes incorporate the civil suit provision into the section that requires
retention of other common-law remedies. Superfund, however, does not include that provision. Id § 9614 (1981).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).
156. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
157. While Superfund attempts to surpass existing environmental legislation it yet resembles other legislative mechanisms because it incorporates other legislation. Nonetheless, no
Superfund provision patterns the civil suit provisions of other legislation. See supra note 36

and the Senate recognized the need for legislation designed to provide some means of protection to victims exposed to hazardous substances. Only the inability to agree on the specific mechanism to
remedy toxic torts prevented the inclusion of a specific provision in
Superfund.
Congress devoted countless hearings and committee reports to
ascertain the precise boundaries of victims' rights and the means
available for compensation.158 Hearings and reports that evaluated
the latest environmental disasters confirmed the need for compensation mechanisms to ensure victims' recovery of the losses attributable
to the illnesses caused by hazardous substances. Traditional common-law remedies simply do not provide the necessary compensatory mechanisms. 59 The existence of a private right of action was
viewed as a supplement to the broad remedial purposes of this legislation. Moreover, the legislative history explicitly authorizes a private right of action.160
The Senate even articulated the parameters of a private cause of
action.' 6 ' Personal injury recovery funds would flow from the compensation fund for out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost earnings;
other damages would flow from lawsuits. 62 Medical causation
would parallel the legal theory of proof for diseases. The victim
would not be required to establish only one cause of action because,
frequently, the harm results from a combination of causes. Once the
victim established by a reasonable likelihood that the exposure
caused or contributed to the injury, the burden of going forward
and accompanying text. This absence strongly supports implying a private right of action
because it brings Superfund within the parameters of Canon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 667 (1979). In Canon, the Court compared other similar civil rights legislation to the
statute at issue.
158. E.g., Hearingson the Kepone Contamination in Hopewell VirginiaBefore the Subcommittee on AgriculturalResearch and GeneralLegislation ofthe Senate Committee on Agricultural
Research and Legislation ofthe Senate Committee on Agriculture andForestry, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); LOVE CANAL-PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1978). Both of the above-reported incidents merited incorpora-

tion into the hearings. See Hazardousand Toxic Waste DisposalCommittee Report, Part I-Part
II, supra note 63; SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 13. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1979); Environmental Policy Division ofthe Congressional Research Service of The Library of
Congress, Senate Comm. on Env. and Public Works, 96th Cong., ist Sess. (1979) (report documenting the cost of pollution).
159. 1d Moreover, the legislation itself recognized the need to evaluate the inconsistent
and inadequate approach of state common-law theories. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 961 I(c)(2) (1980).
160. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979). See infra note 187 and accompanying
text.
161. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
162. The issue caused the greatest amount of discontent in the Senate because the Senate
minority feared that the doctrine of resjudicata would obfuscate the amount of compensation
paid to the claimant. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (minority additional and
supplemental views). See also 125 LEGISLATIVE NOTICE: SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COM-

MITTEE (daily ed. August 25, 1980) (statements of Senators Simpson, Domenci, Dentsen and
Baker).

with the evidence would shift to the defendant. 163 Central to the
private litigant's right of action, the victim would avoid the difficulty
of ascertaining the responsible party because all information incorporated into the Act would be equally binding for the private
victim. 164
The statutory deletion of a victim's administrative right of action does not necessarily evidence an intent to foreclose a private
right of action. Indeed, the number of proposed bills providing for
compensation to the toxic victim support an argument that Congress
intended a private right of action.1 65 The deletion of the administrative remedy only indicates that Congress could not formulate the
proper scope of personal injury damages. 16 6 Deletion of the entire
personal injury compensation scheme from the liability section of
the Act possibly illustrates the drafters' realization of the legislative
difficulty in specifying statutory provisions for all harms resulting
from hazardous substance exposure.167 Superfund leaves an obvious
gap in the liability section, but leaves intact all other provisions pertaining to that right. 168 An implied right of private action would fill
that gap.
C

The Sea Clammers Alternative

Originally, the courts relied on their judicially defined power to
fill the gaps left unaddressed by Congress. 169 Subsequently, the
163. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The congressional position on joint and
several liability also illustrates this concept of causation. See 126 CONG. REC. H 11788 (daily
ed. December 3, 1980) (letter of Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General Office of Legislative Affairs). See also Sam Finley, Inc. v. Waddell, 207 Va. 602, 151 S.E.2d 347 (1969) (pol-

luters whose independent acts cause similar or cumulative injury jointly liable) (dicta). The
latent effects of many injuries make this theory of causation very pertinent to hazardous substance cases. See generally S. BIRNBAUM, P. RHEINGOLD, Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION
(1980); ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, Toxic TORTS (1978).

164.

This provision addresses a real concern. While over 220 federal data systems cur-

rently exist that contain data regarding toxic substances assessment, the material remains very

highly speciaized or difficult to obtain for all but agency purposes. NINTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 205 (1978).

Moreover, the statute eases the

plaintiff's burden of proof by identifying declared hazardous substances.
165.
166.

See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
Administrative compensation has failed to provide awards that reflect inflation and

cost of living increases. Worker's Compensation legislation and social security benefits that
provide specified amounts illustrate the shortcomings. Hutchins, Most Exclusive Remedy Is No
Remedy At .411: Worker's Compensationfor Coveragefor OccupationalDiseases, 32 LAB. L.J.

212 (1981). The latent nature of injuries in environmental harm cases exacerbates the inadequacies of administrative compensation.

167.

The liability provisions of Superfund do not contain compensatory provisions for

pain and suffering. S.1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 4(c), 125 CONG. REC. S9173 (daily ed.
June 11, 1979).
168. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9607, 9614 (Law. Coop. 1980) (the liability provision, as well as the

claims procedure, identifies other parties not explicitly provided for in the strict liability
section).
169. Eg., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1929).

courts began to rely on and implement the congressional intent. 170
The common thread between the implied right of private action and
the federal common law has become the operative language of the
17
statute itself.
Currently, the Supreme Court has followed a course of strict
separation of powers. 72 Judicial reluctance to fashion remedies on
the sole basis that Congress has articulated all the rights in the operative language of the statute, however, is a regression to a situation
that presumes congressional omniscience. 173 Former Senator Ed-

mund Muskie, an adamant supporter of Superfund, quite aptly
pointed out that Congress simply cannot fill all the gaps when legis-

lating in a specific area of law.' 74 Referring specifically to environmental harm cases, Senator Muskie stressed the need to emerge from
the entire system of fundamental
tort concepts, a task that Congress
75
cannot solely accomplish.
If congressional intent, the keystone of the inquiry, evidences a
need for a private cause of action in an area uniquely of federal concern but not yet comprehensively addressed by Congress, the question becomes whether the judiciary should act in the absence of
congressional action. This question recognizes the nature of the tension existing between the judiciary and the legislature. 76 Unques-

tionably, Congress possesses the paramount authority regarding
lawmaking.

77

Therefore, a cause of action founded under the fed-

170. Eg., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Migginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1941).
171. Compare City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981) with
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See also Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248
(3d Cir. 1980).
172. Justice Powell, currently representing the majority view of the Supreme Court, perceives an implied right of action as an unreasonable interference with the separation of powers
dogma. According to Justice Powell, once Congress has legislated in a given area, "[o]ur individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an
enactment is discerned and is constitutionally determined, the judicial process comes to an
end." Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 744-45 (1979).
173. See, e.g., Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 213 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
174. Muskie, Torts, Transportationand Pollution." Do Old Shoes Still Fit, 7 HARV. J. LEG.
477 (1970). Former Senator Muskie noted that the development of a comprehensive scheme of
recovery in wrongful death actions required fifty years. He stated that we cannot afford the
luxury of waiting another fifty years before solving the problems posed by pollution. The
Supreme Court has relied on Senator Muskie's opinion in the past. See EPA v. National
Crushed Stone, 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977).
175. Muskie, supra note 174.
176. The dissent in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) acknowledged the
tension existing between the judiciary and the legislature. See also Ibrondtsen v. Johnson, 343
U.S. 779 (1952).
177. In recognizing a federal common law, the Supreme Court has always exercised sensitivity in acknowledging the legislative branch. E.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 330
(1931).

eral law must reflect the federal interest in delineating rights and
duties, but not to the extent that federal lawmaking power becomes
vested in the judiciary." 8
In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. NationalSea Clammers Association, "I the Court did not address the issue of whether a
private person may have a cause of action under the federal common
law. Rather, the Court alluded to the possibility that both the federal common law and the implied right of private action may combine to form a cause of action for private plaintiffs.I Incorporating
the implied right of private action would prevent a court from exceeding the law implicit in the statute. 18 In refusing to implement
the full force and effect of the congressional intent, however, the judiciary will fail to fulfill its function as a coequal branch.
The Supreme Court denounced the federal common law of nuisance in Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee'8 2 when the concept was beginning to gain substance. Also, the Court desired its holding to ensure
that the lower courts would not utilize the concept to extend the
reach of the statutory language. Moreover, as the federal commonlaw concept developed, it became apparent that the private litigant
would have a cause of action under the federal common law. 183 The
Court evaded precisely that issue to avoid the fear that courts would
impose strict standards under environmental statutes that do not explicitly authorize standards for private individuals.
The drafters of Superfund envisioned the type of private cause
of action founded in federal common law.' 84 This basis of liability
requires balancing two concepts implicit in the federal common law:
the federal interest and the need to avoid the inconsistencies of state

law. 185
178. Arizona v. California, 375 U.S. 546 (1963).
179. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
180. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Moreover, a private cause of
action decided under the federal common law of strict liability represents the most logical
extension of both the NationalSea Clammers case and the City fMilwaukee case. In circuit
court opinions, the courts would analyze both concepts in determining that a cause of action
did or did not exist. See supra note 98. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), recognized
that both concepts inextricably intertwine. Labor relations cases have also recently recognized
this possibility. E.g., Gleis v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980).
181. Incorporating the implied right of action into the federal common law would create a
further advantage because Superfund would set forth the technical requirements. The majority in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), felt that the federal common law
could not adequately address the technical difficulty inherent in environmental problems. The
dissenting opinion pointed out, however, that the complexity of the subject did not justify
denying that a federal common law exists. Id at 349 n.25. Nonetheless, all technical information and requirements would appear within Superfund, thereby obviating the fear pervading
the majority opinion in City of Milwaukee.
182. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
183. See supra note 98.
184. See infra note 191.
185. Originally, the Supreme Court analysis examined the interstate concern before any
other interest. Eg., State of Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 406 (1906). In situations involving

Undoubtedly, toxic substances constitute a federal concern even
though state law has traditionally handled this subject matter.
Traditional common-law theories, however, have failed to provide
both an adequate legal mechanism and a uniform standard. Federal
common law avoids subjecting the problem to inconsistent state
laws. Congress recognized that the creation of a federal cause of
action might duplicate causes of action founded in state law, but acknowledged that it could confer a federal cause of action when a
clear need presented itself.'8 6 Victims of toxic time bombs have
presented that clear need.
Implying a private right of action under the Superfund legislation should be based on strict liability because the Act articulates
that standard. 187 The implied right of action finds support in the
principle that the Act specifies rights and duties. 88 The federal common law, however, is premised on the rationale that the court must
define the rights and duties of the federal concern unaddressed statutorily. 89 The judiciary must implement the remedial provisions of
the statute, but not extend those duties in excess of the Act's stated
goals.
Superfund establishes a standard of strict liability and delineates rights and duties, but does not make those rights and duties explicitly applicable to private victims. Utilizing both the federal
common-law and implied right of action concepts would directly improve this legislation. Use of the federal common-law concept alone
does not afford the benefit of the statute and might allow courts to
impose stricter standards than those delineated by the statute.19 0
Similarly, the implied right of action theory may pattern too closely
both the statute and the congressional proposal of out-of-pocket
medical expenses and lost earnings. Hence, there would be a need
for another lawsuit or a pendent state action that would bring the
solution full cycle to the problem.
a strong state interest, however, the Supreme Court usually deferred to the state policy, in the
absence of a clear federal interest. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Wheldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). The federal common law differs from the general common law,
a distinction that the Supreme Court has recognized. Eg., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981). See also Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489 (1954).
186. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980), which states the following:
Out of respect for the Federal system created by the Constitution the Congress is
generally reluctant to create a cause of action founded on federal law which might
duplicate causes founded on state law. Indeed, it is primarily for this reason that the
cause of action established by this action is restrained in the types of incidents covered, the type of damages which are compensable, the classes of victims protected
and the like. Nevertheless, the Congress has not hesitated to enact remedial legislation conferring a Federal cause of action where there was a clear need.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).
188. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 77-121 and accompanying text.
190. This result would contradict City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).

An implied right of action under the federal common law of
strict liability would provide the basis for a cause of action to fill the
interstices of a federal framework not yet entirely pervasive.19 ' Private litigants would receive the opportunity to recover both personal
injury and economic loss damages. This result would comport with
the remedial provisions of Superfund, but would not exceed the liability provisions permitted by the Act. Moreover, the legislative history directly provides the foundation for a cause of action.
Most importantly, a private cause of action under the federal
common-law of strict liability would be consistent with the optimal
result sought by Superfund: control of hazardous substances by virtue of the federally permitted release requirements. 92 Superfund revolves around the federally permitted release requirements because
only a violation of those requirements will trigger enforcement
mechanisms. Persons injured by a release in compliance with federal requirements must secure
their damage recovery through some
93
mechanisms.
legal
other
Thus, a private individual could sue only if the injury resulted
from a release of a named hazardous substance that exceeded the
federally permitted release requirements. 94 When a release occurred in violation of the statute, a court would rely, independently
of the statute, on a federal common-law concept of strict liability
when delineating the rights and duties of the private litigant. Simultaneously, the court would rely on implied right of action concepts in
determining just how far the statute creates such rights and duties.
This method would punish those industries that blatantly disregarded the statutory requirements and provide protection to those
industries that complied with the federally permitted release requirements. 95 In addition, the method would prevent the anamolous result that natural resources owned by the government receive more
protection than the injured victim. 96 The legislative history of
Superfund supports this form of cause of action that provides a remedy restricted to the type of incident covered by the Act's liability
191. Well-documented final debates in both the House and the Senate fully illustrate
Superfund's failure to pervade the field. See generally 126 CONG. REC. H 11773 (daily ed.
December 3, 1980) (text of final House debate), 126 CoNG. REc. S14948 (daily ed. November
24, 1980) (text of final Senate debate).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).
193. Id § 96070).
194. Id
195. The problem of achieving compliance by industries with environmental statutes results because many of the statutes and accompanying regulations speak in terms of aspirational commands. Henderson & Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmental Policies: The
Limits of,4spirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978). Aspirational commands
seek cooperation, but their lack of power to enforce the commands actually serves as a disincentive for those who do cooperate.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980). See also 126 CONG. REC. S14973 (daily ed. November 24, 1980) (statement of Senator Mitchell).

provision. 19 7
Combining both the federal common-law concept and the private right of action concept at least provides the private litigant with
the opportunity to confront the responsible party and provides victims with some viable means of recovery. It also promises compensation for all damages. Moreover, it puts the developed perspectives
of two well-established principles in their proper current context.
without offending the stringent separation of powers dogma that has
permeated recent Supreme Court decisions. Most importantly, an
implied right of action under the federal common law of strict liability would facilitate the understanding that industries must recognize
98
environmental problems.1
IV.

Conclusion

The ramifications implicit in the drafting of Superfund warrant
heightened protection to injured victims. Reconciling the latest
Supreme Court decisions with the clear mandate of Superfund
should not result in a judicial reluctance to apply federal commonlaw concepts. Congress should not have only partially completed the
task of compensating victims. Nonetheless, amending the Superfund
legislation to compensate victims is unlikely because administrative
compensation does not, and cannot, reflect the amount of damages
incurred by the victims of toxic time bombs. Creating a private right
of action under a federal common law of strict liability effectuates
the remedial provisions of Superfund while a contrary holding perpetuates the obvious gap in protection afforded the victims. It is time
to bridge that gap.
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197. See supra notes 124-173.
198. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980). The Supreme
Court held that economic incapability of achieving an efficient standard pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was not an acceptable defense. Rather, the statute forced
industries to use the best available technology.

